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CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
Relief for Vendee from Vendor's Strike
by Warren D. Langer*O NE RESULT of the complexity of our modern civilization is the
harming of those with whom we have no contentions or find
no fault, while attempting to alleviate difficulties and disagree-
ments with others whose paths we cross and whose interests con-
flict with ours.
Many situations exemplify the conditions stated above, but
one frequently encountered is the harm caused to a vendee when
a vendor is on strike. While there may be no intent, reason, or
desire to harm the vendee, lack of materials, fuel, services, or
some other necessity provided by the vendor forces the vendee
to curtail operations, or to let his plant lay idle and risk the loss
of skilled workers.
What can the vendee, the innocent party, do? It is true that
there is not always a remedy for this situation, and sometimes
such remedy as is available may be more costly than warranted.
However, there are several rights or actions which may be
exercised of which four should be noted: 1. Breach of contract;
2. Action against the striking union; 3. Use of the mails; 4. The
writ of replevin.
Breach of Contract.
The most apparent remedy is an action against the vendor for
breach of contract because of failure to perform within a rea-
sonable time,1 or within a stipulated time. The use of this
remedy, however, has been almost completely circumscribed by
the inclusion, in the vast majority of contracts, of strike clauses
which attempt to relieve the vendor of liability due to strikes.
Where there is no strike clause in a contract, and the vendor
has assumed an unqualified promise to perform, he may not
utilize the fact of a strike as a defense in a breach of contract
suit. In Schaefer v. Brunswick Laundry,2 the court said: "Gen-
erally, impossibility of performance offers no relief from per-
* Warren D. Langer is a graduate of Fenn College and a veteran of 3 years
of army service in the Pacific during World War II. He is married and
the father of two children.
'Empire Transp. Co. et al. v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 77 Fed.919 (1896); (discharge of the cargo of a vessel a week late, delay havingbeen caused by a strike of the employees of the charterer without griev-
ance or warning, was held to be within a reasonable time).2116 N. J. L. 268, 183 Atl. 175 (1936).
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formance of contractual obligation whether impossibility could
or could not have been foreseen at time of making the contract,
except where impossibility arises by operation of law, where a
thing necessary to performance is destroyed, or where the con-
tract calls for personal services and the party to perform or re-
ceive performance dies." A strike in this case was held not to
fall into any of the three aforementioned exceptions.
In Ohio there is no case directly on point, but two decisions
3
indicate that a similar holding would be adhered to if such ques-
tion should arise.
Where strike clauses are included in the contract, the extent
to which the vendee's actions are limited are determined by the
phraseology of the particular clause. In Consolidated Coal Co. of
St. Louis v. Jones and Adams Co.,4 the contract stipulated that
the vendor should not be required to furnish coal "during any
portion of the time when prevented by strikes, unavoidable acci-
dents, or other causes beyond its control from handling the
product of the mine at which the coal herein provided for is
produced." The court held that this strike clause did not apply
to strikes by third parties although the strike affected the pos-
sibility of performance by the vendor.5 In General Commercial
Co. v. Butterworth-Judson Corp.6 a clause stating, "This contract
is contingent upon strikes, fires, pestilence, riots, war, rebellion,
and other causes beyond our control.. ." was, on the other hand,
construed by the court to include strikes by third persons.7
'Universal Coal Co. v. Old Ben Coal Corp., 32 Ohio App. 254, 167 N. E.
904 (1929); (under contract for sale of coal, seller was held not excused
because of fire, embargo, and labor trouble. Labor trouble here was not a
strike, but a refusal to work until paid); Lima Locomotive & Machine Co.
v. National Steel Castings Co., 155 Fed. 77 (1907).
232 Ill. 326, 83 N. E. 851 (1908).
'Ibid. In this case an extensive strike among the anthracite coal miners
of the country during the period covered by a contract of sale of biturni-
nous coal, occasioned in part, a very serious shortage of cars, and pre-
vented appellant from performing his contract to furnish coal to appellee.
The court held that this strike was not within the clause of the contract
exempting seller from the duty to furnish coal during any portion of the
time when prevented by strikes. The strike clause was intended to apply
only to strikes affecting the handling of the output of the seller's own
mine.
'198 N. Y. App. Div. 799, 191 N. Y. Supp. 64 (1921).
'Ibid. A contract for shipment of goods "July-August, seller's option,"
providing that "This contract is contingent upon strikes, fires, pestilence,
riots, war, rebellion, and other causes beyond our control," did not require
purchaser to accept goods shipped subsequent to August on vendor's fail-
ure to ship during July or August because of a strike at the German
works of the vendor's supplier; the clause merely excused, in the named
contingencies, failure to deliver, and not delay in delivering.
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol1/iss1/11
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Where the meaning of the strike clause is clear, then a right
of action may depend on the facts. In American Fruit Distribu-
tors of California v. Hines, Director General of Railroads, et al.,8
wherein the defendant was a carrier and therefore an insurer
of the goods, the court held that it was incumbent upon the de-
fendant to prove that every reasonable effort was made to re-
place striking workmen in order to avail themselves of the strike
clause and relieve themselves of liability for failure to deliver.
Actions Against a Union.
In 1947 Congress deemed it advisable to amend The National
Labor Relations Act (The Wagner Act) by passing The Labor
Management Relations Act (The Taft-Hartley Law).9 This Act
did not create a new action for damages for breach of a labor
contract. Liability and the right of suit for breach of contract
existed prior to these Acts and were predicated on the rules of
law applying generally to contracts. For example, it had long
been held, that in some cases, damages could be recovered for
losses caused by a secondary boycott. These actions, however,
did not involve the wide latitude of present laws, but were based
on some other point such as a conspiracy to produce a breach of
contract. 10
The present law as enunciated in the Labor-Management Re-
lations Act is much broader and authorizes damage suits which
are, to a very considerable extent, a novel species of action newly
introduced into our body of law.,' These actions for damages
55 Calif. App. 377, 203 Pac. 821 (1921).
49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. App. § 151 (1946) as amended, 61 Stat. 158 (1947),
29 U. S. C. App. § 187 (Supp. 1947).
"New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern et al., 218 Mass. 198, 105
N. E. 885 (1914).
" Taft-Hartley Act, supra, note 9, at tit. 111, § 303: "(a) It shall be unlaw-
ful, for the purposes of this section only, in an industry or activity affecting
commerce, for any labor organization to engage in, or to induce or
encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a
concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture.
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services where an object
thereof is--
(1) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join
any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to
cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person;
(2) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1952
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caused by a strike in furtherance of a secondary boycott or other
unlawful combination 12 may be maintained by any person13 in-
jured thereby in his business or property.14 However such suits
may be brought only against labor organizations (incorporated
or unincorporated),15 since the Act specifically provides that "it
shall be unlawful... for any labor organization16 ... " to commit
the acts enumerated. 17
I It is stated'8 that subsection 303 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Law is
general in its application. Although up to the present time, man-
agement has not found it desirable to utilize this cause of action to
any great extent, it is believed that suits for libel or slander, for
personal or property damage, for injuries resulting from unfair
labor practices, and even for violation of state laws, although no
Federal Law may be involved, would seem to be permitted.
Unions are attempting to nullify the provisions of this law
by agreement with those with whom they have a contract, but
such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of Section 159 of this title;
(3) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a
particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if
another labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of Section 159 of this title;
(4) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to
employees in a particular labor organization or in another trade, craft,
or class unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certifi-
cation of the National Labor Relations Board determining the bargaining
representative for employees performing such work. Nothing contained
in this subsection shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any
person to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his own
employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike
ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such
employer is required to recognize under subchapter II of this chapter; . .
Rothenberg, Labor Relations 645.
"Am. Jur. 1951 Cumulative Supplement-Labor 298.5.
"Emphasis supplied.
"Taft-Hartley Law, supra, note 9, at tit. 111, § 303(b) provides that
"whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any
violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue therefore in any
district court of the United States subject to the limitations and pro-
visions of Section 185 of this title without respect to the amount in con-
troversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall
recover the damages by him sustained and cost of the suit."
"Williams v. United Mine Workers, 294 Ky. 520, 172 S. W. 2d 202 (1943)
and United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922)
held an unincorporated union to be subject to suit; Nissen v. International
Brotherhood, T. C. S. H., 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N. W. 858 (1941), held an
unincorporated union, however, not subject to suit in its name alone.
"Emphasis supplied.
"Taft-Hartley Law, supra, note 11.
'173 Amer. Lab. Rep. 1434, Labor Relations Act-Modifications P. 44.
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the possibility of exempting themselves from liability to third
persons who are injured by their actions seems to be beyond
their power.19
Among the few reported cases based on the Taft-Hartley Law
is International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union et al.
v. Juneau Spruce Corporation2o which held that damages could
be recovered against a union other than the union with which
the employer has contracted when such union engaged in a
secondary boycott and caused injuries to the employer. While
there was no vendor-vendee relationship in this case, the right
to maintain this action, based on Section 303, subsections (a) and
(b), was upheld although no contractual relationship existed.
Use of the Mails.
When the vendee desires only to obtain goods which are in a
strike-bound plant of the vendor, parcel post or the writ of re-
plevin may be utilized. The use of parcel post is not a form of
legal relief, but a type of remedy which may be recommended
with all propriety when the situation warrants it.
The utilization of this form of relief is restricted, however, by
at least three other factors: first, the size of the package is
limited by postal regulations and this limitation on size varies
according to the class of post office serving the area where the
goods are mailed; second, the availability of sufficient personnel
for packaging and wrapping the articles to be mailed; third, the
accessibility of a mail box or post office.
This relief is dependent almost entirely on the cooperation
of the vendor. The vendee may suggest or request this method
and in some cases may require or force the vendor to use the
mails, the writer believes, where, in some rare instance, a decree
of specific performance of the contract of sale is appropriate.
Writ of Replevin.
The other method of obtaining goods is by a writ of replevin.
Although there are no reported cases on point, several have
been recorded by the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga
Ibid.
"189 F. 2d 177 (1951).
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County.2 1 A check of the records reveals that the petition in
replevin, affidavit in replevin, journal entry, motion (immediate
delivery of goods), waiver and release by Defendant, summons
in action for replevin, appraisement of attachment, writ of re-
plevin and surety bond, are all executed on the same day. Little
delay is encountered in obtaining the desired writ. The vendee
(who supplies his own transportation facilities) goes to the
vendor's plant, escorted by the sheriff, and after exhibiting the
writ of replevin, has the goods loaded and removed from the
struck plant. The sheriff does no part of the work. He merely
supervises the loading so that only those goods shown in the
writ of replevin are removed.
The experience with this type of procedure has been that
unions respect the court order and little violence is ever en-
countered.
A vendee is not, of course, always entitled to a writ of
replevin. He must allege ownership and wrongful detention, but
the writer believes that a proper action for this writ may be
maintained in several instances among which are situations
where a subcontractor (vendor) is doing work on the vendee's
product; a supplier (vendor) is using the vendee's equipment;
or material or equipment is being made for the vendee which
the vendee has financed by advance payment.
An example of the usefulness of this type of action would be
a situation wherein production and assembly lines are held up
for some part because a vendee's die is in a struck plant. Re-
moval of the die to some other stamping company or acquisition
of a completed die (or one almost completed) from the manu-
facturer, would enable the vendee to have the required parts
(made from the dies) produced by a company not on strike.
All of the recorded cases examined by the writer indicated
a spirit of cooperation between the vendor and vendee. Both
parties were apparently eager to fulfill their parts of the contract
but were prevented from completion of their agreement by an
'1950; Ford Motor Co. v. Globe Stamping Co., Division of Hupp Corp.;
Docket No. 615578;
1951; Chevrolet Cleveland Div. General Motors Corp. v. Geometric
Stamping Co.; Docket No. 627578;
1951; General Electric Co. v. Geometric Stamping Co.; Docket No.
627260;
1950; International Harvester Co. v. Hupp Corp.; Docket No. 615594;




intervening strike. No attempt to thwart the effects of the strike
by strike-breaking activities-no attempt of further production by
the vendor-no attempt to benefit the vendor at the cost of the
striking employees was discovered nor would such activities be
advocated. The cases seem to be an attempt solely to prevent
excessive loss to the vendee.
When the obtaining of materials or parts by an innocent ven-
dee will preclude the possibility of excessive loss to such vendee
and when no harm to the strikers' cause will be effected by such
action, it is difficult to find any objection to the use of this form
of relief.
Conclusion.
While all persons affected by strikes do not have an available
remedy, there are many situations where rights and actions have
not been exercised and innocent persons have suffered although
the necessity of doing so has been precluded by our existing
laws.
In the first remedy, breach of contract, an injured vendee may
maintain an action either against a vendor who fails to protect
himself by an appropriate strike clause or a vendor who willfully
breaches a contract and then attempts to utilize the fact of a
strike as a defense. The second remedy, an action against the
striking union, is aimed at unions which engage in unlawful
activities. The third and fourth remedies, use of the mails and
writ of replevin, are not actions for damages but methods of pre-
cluding damage. Although the use of these two remedies need
not be on a "friendly" basis they usually are undertaken in co-
operation with, or with consent of, the vendor.
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